PhoenixSig is not another PQC signature. It's a signing operating system that combines post-quantum algorithms, deterministic state evolution, and hardware-backed recovery into a system designed to survive breach.
PhoenixSig treats every signature as a temporary state snapshot — not a permanent operation. Remove any layer, and the security model breaks.
Module-Lattice Digital Signature Algorithm. Fast signing (~2ms), compact signatures. Lattice-based security. Primary signer for performance-critical operations.
Stateless Hash-based Digital Signature Algorithm. Conservative security from hash functions only. Larger signatures but minimal cryptographic assumptions. Secondary signer for maximum assurance.
Both algorithms sign simultaneously. Both must verify. If a mathematical breakthrough breaks lattice assumptions, hash-based signatures remain secure. Defense-in-depth at the algorithm level.
All epoch public keys committed to a Merkle tree. Single root hash. O(log n) verification for any epoch. Compact proof that a key was legitimately generated by the system.
External randomness (OS RNG) cannot be audited, reproduced, or tested deterministically. PhoenixSig needs a core that evolves forward-only, produces unpredictable but reproducible output, and never depends on external entropy for state progression.
DyLWE operates on R_q = Z_q[X]/(X^N+1). Learning With Rounding provides deterministic noise through rounding operations. No sampling, no external randomness in the evolution step.
seed_epoch = HKDF(VaultKey ∥ sigma ∥ ctx). Every signing key is derived from hardware secret + evolving state + operation context. Deterministic, auditable, but unpredictable without VaultKey.
State (sigma, epoch, counter) only moves forward. No rollback possible. Anti-rollback enforced by monotonic counters and state hash chains.
Each device holds a VaultKey in a Trusted Execution Environment (Android Keystore / Secure Enclave). Non-exportable. All key derivation flows through VaultKey — this is the PCS invariant.
VaultKey ← HKDF(VaultKey ∥ new_secret, "phoenix"). After refresh, every future seed changes completely. An attacker with full RAM + storage snapshot before refresh has zero knowledge of future keys.
Every hash, KDF, PRF, and state evolution MUST depend on the current VaultKey. ctx = H("PhoenixSig|ctx", epoch, counter, message, policy, vault.salt32(...)). Violate this rule, and PCS dies.
On reboot, suspected compromise, or sync loss: quarantine activates. No real payloads signed. Only pings and dummy operations. System waits for hardware-confirmed entropy injection before resuming.
GenericPCSWrapper provides an algorithm-agnostic interface. Any PQC algorithm that implements Sign(sk, msg) → sig and Verify(pk, msg, sig) → bool can be wrapped in PCS guarantees within one day.
Key Update Security Semantics — the formal verification framework. 100% validation pass rate. Mathematical proof that PCS properties hold across algorithm changes.
Mathematical proof framework validating security properties: forward secrecy, post-compromise recovery, epoch isolation, state evolution correctness.
Start with a free 30-day pilot. Experience self-healing cryptographic infrastructure.